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Abstract
We study, using laboratory experiments, the extent to which disclosure poli-
cies about the financial health of a bank affect the likelihood of a bank run.
We consider two disclosure regimes, full disclosure and no disclosure, under
two scenarios: one in which the bank is on average financially solvent and
another in which the bank is on average insolvent. When the bank is on
average insolvent, the full disclosure regime reduces the expected likelihood
of runs. In contrast, when the bank is on average solvent, the full disclosure
regime increases the expected likelihood of runs. Our evidence illustrates
the importance of contemporary financial disclosure regulations.
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1 Introduction
The stability of financial systems has been at the top of policy agendas after the
2007-2008 financial crisis. In reaction, there has been a growing consensus for
increased transparency about the health of financial institutions.1, 2 Since 2015,
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has continued its recommendations
toward increased disclosure by banks about their financial state (see the BCBS
report for 2015 and 2018). Currently, the Bank of England has a statutory duty
to reveal when a financial institution applies for emergency funding. However,
such a policy is not adopted everywhere. Most notably, the US Federal Reserve
has a policy of not publicly disclosing its CAMELS ratings.3
In this paper, we aim to provide experimental evidence that will help discern
whether or not regulators should commit themselves to revealing the health of
financial institutions. Whilst we recognise that runs on financial institutions
can sometimes be optimal for depositors (see Alonso, 1996), such events are
nevertheless undesirable for regulators.
We base our experimental design on the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model
where a bank faces short-term liquidity constraints anduncertainty about its long-
term health.4 We consider two economic outlooks, weak and strong, differing in
the distribution of returns on the bank’s long-term assets, which proxy the bank’s
long-term health. For both types of outlooks, the distribution in returns of the
bank’s long-term assets includes values for which it is a dominant strategy for
depositors to run (i.e., the prisoners’ dilemma), as well as values for which the
no run equilibrium is feasible as in the standard Diamond and Dybvig model.
The former case we refer to as an insolvent bank, while the latter case we refer to
as a solvent bank.5 There is a higher chance for depositors to face the prisoners’
dilemma (an insolvent bank) when the outlook is weak relative to when it is
1One of the main recommendations from the “Squam Lake Report" (French et al., 2010) is for
regulators to increase the dissemination of collected information about financial institutions to
the private sector.
2The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 mandates the
Federal Reserve to conduct supervisory “stress tests" on large financial institutions and publicly
disclose the results by June 30th of the calendar year. However, it is not obvious as to whether
such disclosure is necessarily beneficial (see Goldstein and Sapra, 2014).
3Supporting this contrasting view of non-disclosure, Gorton (2009) argues that the creation
of the ABX.HE index precipitated the run on subprime bonds, by revealing information about
beliefs concerning the riskiness of those assets.
4The Diamond-Dybvig model is also used to study currency attack (e.g., Obstfeld, 1995) and
roll-over risk (e.g., He and Xiong, 2012; Martin et al., 2014).
5Hence, a run on a solvent bank is a liquidity problem rather than a solvency problem in that
if all depositors delay withdrawing, then they would each receive more than they could today.
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strong and, in fact, a bank with a return equal to the expected return would be
insolvent in the weak outlook and solvent in the strong outlook.
To study the role of information disclosure on bank runs, we implement two
regimes differing onwhether depositors are informed of the returns on the bank’s
long-term assets. In the first regime, there is a no disclosure policy in which
depositors must decide whether or not to withdraw their deposits knowing only
the distribution of returns to bank’s long-term assets. In the second regime, there
is a full disclosure policy in which depositors know the actual returns to the
long-term assets before making their withdrawal decisions.
The influence of information disclosure on bank runs is non-trivial due to the
existence of multiple equilibria when the bank is solvent. This task is therefore
well suited to laboratory experiments where the confounding forces such as
beliefs and experiences can be carefully controlled.
Our experiment shows that information disclosure is a double-edged sword.
When the outlook is weak, the no disclosure policy leads to more runs than the
full disclosure policy. The opposite is true when the outlook is strong: the full
disclosure policy leads to more runs than the no disclosure policy. In both cases,
results are driven by behaviour at the extremes of the distribution of returns: full
disclosure is beneficial when the outlook is weak because it informs depositors
in the rare event it is rational not to run. In contrast, no disclosure under a strong
outlook prevented runs in the rare event that returns were too low and running
on the bank is a dominant strategy. Essentially, when the outlook is strong, it is
beneficial to hide bad information within overall good information. When the
outlook is weak, it is beneficial to allow good information to be revealed against a
backdrop of overall bad information. As awhole, our results show that disclosure
rules can have significant influence on bank runs.
We contribute to the body of experimental literature that studies bank runs
in the spirit of the Diamond and Dybvig model (see Dufwenberg, 2015, for a
survey of the literature). In particular, there are a number of studies that examine
the influence of external information on depositors’ withdrawal decisions. In
Arifovic and Jiang (2014), the depositors observe an external signal, a random
public announcement stating the “predicted” deposit withdrawals. They find
that depositors are more likely to follow the unconnected external signals when
parameters are such that there is high strategic uncertainty as to which equilib-
rium will form. Chakravarty et al. (2014) and Brown et al. (2017) look at the
possibility of bank run contagions in the sense that a publicly visible run on one
bank triggers a run on another. Both papers find evidence of bank run contagions
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when the fundamentals of two banks are linked. Consistent with the findings of
Arifovic and Jiang (2014), Chakravarty et al. (2014) also find that depositors may
get influenced by external information when the fundamentals are not linked.6
Finally, there is also theoretical work on the role of announcements regarding the
health of bank on bank runs (e.g., Gorton, 1985; Chari and Jagannathan, 1988;
Kaplan, 2006; Dang et al., 2017; Ebert et al., 2018). We extend this literature by
looking at the influence of disclosure policies (under full commitment) on the
likelihood of a run on a bank.
There is a related strand of experimental literature that uses the global games
(e.g., Carlsson and van Damme, 1993; Morris and Shin, 2002) paradigm to study
the effects of information transparency or disclosures on coordination failures—
seeGoldstein andPauzner (2005) for an application of global games in bank runs.7
For example, Anctil et al. (2004, 2010) find that changes to transparency, modelled
by the precision of players’ private information, can affect coordination failures.8
Heinemann et al. (2004) experimentally study the role of public information in
global games framed as currency attacks. They consider two treatments, one
where the true state is fully revealed by the public signal and the other where the
true state is not revealed (i.e., players receive noisy private signals). They find
that public information reduces coordination failures and increases the success
likelihood of currency attacks. Finally, Banerjee and Maier (2016) use global
games to investigate the granularity of thepublic signal on coordination failures—
all players receive noisy private signals. They find that the effect of information
transparency, a more granular public signal, depends on whether the public
signal is “pessimistic" or “optimistic". More specifically, greater transparency
increases the likelihood of coordination failure (i.e., bank runs) when the public
signal is pessimistic and reduces the likelihood of coordination failure when the
public signal is optimistic.9
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 details our experiment
design. Section 3 details the experimental procedures. Section 4 reports the
experimental results. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
6There is also bank run literature about depositors observing withdrawals in their own bank
(e.g., Schotter and Yorulmazer, 2009; Garratt and Keister, 2009; Kiss et al., 2012).
7In global games (Morris and Shin, 1998, 2002), a continuum of players each receive a private
noisy signal about the true state of nature. The experimental literature obviously considers a
finite number of players but keep the noisy private signal paradigm.
8In general, they find that increasing the precision of player’s private information increases
coordination on risk-dominance (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988) equilibria.
9The findings of Banerjee and Maier (2016) are not necessarily contradictory to our results
since both studies use fundamentally different paradigms to model bank runs.
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2 Experiment Design
We consider a simple two-player bank run game that is inspired by the Diamond
and Dybvig (1983) model. In order to focus on the role of information disclosure,
we use a two-player game so as to minimise the difficulty in evaluating the
strategic uncertainty of other players.10
The game is summarised in Figure 1. There are two depositors, each with
400 deposited in a bank. Each depositor decides (simultaneously) to withdraw
his money early (e) or late (l). The bank faces short-term liquidity constraints
and uncertainty about about its long-term fundamentals. To model the long-
term fundamentals, we assume that nature determines the bank to be one of
eleven possible types, θ ∈ Θ  {θ1, . . . θ11}, with equal probability of each type.
The bank collapses if any depositor withdraws early and the bank is only worth
its liquidation value of 400, which is equally shared among all depositors who
withdrew early. If both depositors withdraw late, the payoffs to each depositor is
Rj(θ) ≥ 0, where j  S,W denotes the long-term economic outlook that can either
be weak (W) or strong (S)—the bank’s long-term fundamentals are reflected in the
outlook.11 The outlook, whether it is weak or strong, is known to both depositors
(not necessarily the bank’s type).
The first two rows of Panels A and B of Table 1 detail the corresponding Rj(θ)
for each type when the outlook is weak and strong, respectively. For example,
if the outlook is weak (resp. strong) and both depositors withdraw late, each
depositor receives 250 (resp. 550) when the bank’s type is θ6. Depositors face the
prisoners’ dilemma when 200 ≤ Rj(θ) < 400 and the coordination game when
Rj(θ) ≥ 400. When both depositors withdraw late, there is a 8/11 (resp. 2/11)
chance of receiving less than their deposited amount when the outlook is weak
(resp. strong).
Orthogonal to the above, we also consider two information regimes: full in-
formation and no information. In the full information regime, depositors observe
the bank’s type before they make their withdrawal decisions. In contrast, depos-
itors in the no information regime do not observe the bank’s type before making
decisions (but do still know whether the outlook is weak or strong). The full
and no information conditions are analogous to a setting where a regulator is
10When there are n > 2 players in the bank run game, each player must not only form beliefs
about other players’ actions but also beliefs about how correlated these actions may be.
11We are neutral as to the interpretation of types. One possibility is for θ to correspond to the
probability that the bank will collapse in the long-run, even if all depositors withdrew late. In
this case, Rj(θ)  X(1 − pj(θ)) where pj(θ) ∈ [0, 1] is the type θ’s probability of collapsing in state
j and X > 0 is the payoff to the depositor if the bank does not collapse.
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Withdraw Early (e)
Withdraw Late (l)
Withdraw Early (e) Withdraw Late (l)
200, 200 400, 0
0, 400 Rj(θ), Rj(θ)
Note. The values in each cell denote the payoffs to the row (Depositor 1) and column (Depositor
2) players, respectively. The variable Rj(θ) ≥ 0 depends on the bank’s outlook j  W,S and the
bank’s type θ. When the outlook is weak (W), RW(θ) can take the values 0, 50, 100, ..., 500 with
equal probability of each. When the outlook is strong, RS(θ) can take the values 300, 350, ..., 800
with equal probability of each.
Figure 1. Bank run game.
Panel A: The weak outlook (FW game).
Type θ1 θ2 θ3 θ4 θ5 θ6 θ7 θ8 θ9 θ10 θ11
RW(θ) 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
iPure-Strategy eq. ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee
ll⊥ ll⊥ ll⊥
iiMixed-Strategy eq. 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.20 0.33
Panel B: The strong outlook (FS game).
Type θ1 θ2 θ3 θ4 θ5 θ6 θ7 θ8 θ9 θ10 θ11
RS(θ) 300 350 400 450 500 550 600∗ 650 700 750 800
iPure-Strategy eq. ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee
ll⊥ ll⊥ ll⊥ ll⊥ ll

⊥ ll

⊥ ll

⊥ ll

⊥ ll

⊥
iiMixed-Strategy eq. 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.20 0.33 0.43 0.50 0.56 0.60 0.64 0.67
Note The shaded columns in Panels A and B denote the equilibria in the NW and NS games,
respectively, if the depositors are risk-neutral.
iHere, ee and lldenote the outcomeswhere both depositorswithdraw early and late, respectively.
Where relevant, the  and ⊥ denote the risk dominant and payoff dominant equilibria, respectively.
ii The mixed-strategy refers to the probability of withdrawing early.
Table 1. Payoff parameters and pure strategy equilibria.
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committed to always revealing the bank’s type and never revealing the bank’s
type, respectively.
The above considerations result in a 2 × 2 design with the following four
games: FW game (full information; weak outlook), NW game (no information;
weak outlook), FS game (full information; strong outlook) and NS game (no in-
formation; strong outlook).12 Panels A and B of Table 1 also detail the equilibrium
(pure-strategy and mixed-strategy) given each type θ in the FW and FS games,
respectively. The shaded columns in Panels A and B detail the equilibrium in the
NW and NS games, respectively.13
We study each outlook separately to better understand how information dis-
closure about the bank’s type, affects the expected likelihood of bank runs, that is,
the ex-ante probability of a bank run before θ is resolved by nature. Intuitively,
this will broadly depend on whether depositors coordinate on the ee (both with-
draw early) or ll (both withdraw late) equilibrium when Rj(θ) ≥ 400. Harsanyi
and Selten (1988) argue that this may depend on whether the equilibrium is risk
dominant or payoff dominant. (these are denoted on Table 1 by the “" and “⊥"
symbols, respectively).14
2.1 The impact of information disclosure
Tostudy the impact of informationdisclosurewhen theoutlook isweak (resp. strong)
we focus on theNW and FW (resp.NS and FS) games, assuming risk-neutral de-
positors.
Weak outlook. Information disclosure reduces the expected likelihood of a
bank run when depositors play the mixed-strategy equilibria or when depositors
coordinate on the payoff dominance equilibrium.15 In contrast, information dis-
closure has no influence on the expected likelihood of a bank runwhendepositors
coordinate on the payoff dominance equilibrium.16
12Depositors in the NW and NW games face both strategic uncertainties as to the decisions of
their peer and fundamental uncertainties as to the bank’s type. In contrast, depositors in the FS
and FS games only face strategic uncertainties.
13The behaviour in such games may resemble risk-neutral play which is identical to when the
bank’s type is known to be θ6.
14When R(θ)  600, the risk-dominance equilibrium corresponds to the mixed-strategy pre-
diction that depositors withdraw early with probability 1/2. However, since we already assume
that investors always coordinate on one of the pure-strategy equilibria, they cannot play the
mixed-strategy. As such, we assume that they play the payoff-dominance equilibria.
15The mixed-strategy equilibria in the NW and FW games are for depositors’ expected proba-
bility of withdrawing early to be 1.00 and 0.78, respectively.
16Experimental research with the stag-hunt game suggests that whether people coordinate on
the risk or payoff dominance equilibria can depend on thematching protocol or payoff parameters
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Strong outlook. Information disclosure reduces the expected likelihood of a
bank run when depositors coordinate on the risk dominance equilibrium. In
contrast, information disclosure increases the expected likelihood of a bank run
when depositors coordinate on the payoff dominance equilibrium or play the
mixed-strategy equilibria.17
3 Procedures
The NW (72 subjects), FW (78 subjects), NS (74 subjects) and FS (80 subjects)
treatments were conducted in 2016, recruiting from the student cohort at Uni-
versity of Erlangen-Nuremberg—see Table A1 of the Appendix for details about
the experimental sessions. Subjects were recruited on a first come basis through
ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). The sessionswere programmed and conductedwith ztree
(Fischbacher, 2007).
Each experimental session consistedof partsAandB—bothparts are identical.
In part A (resp. B), subjects played 19 (resp. 17) rounds of the corresponding
games with random matching at each round and one experimental round was
randomly chosen for payment—we pool data from both parts for the analysis.
When subjects received the instructions for part A, they were unaware of part B’s
design.18 In each round, we also used an incentive compatiblemechanism to elicit
subjects’ beliefs about their opponents likelihood ofwithdrawing early.19 Subjects
received feedback at the end of each round as to their payoffs and the bank’s
type—payoffs were denoted in the currency ECU. For efficient comparisons, we
pre-generated four sequences of θ and applied them accordingly to the respective
sessions. In addition to ae4 show-up payment, subjects’ payoff from parts A and
B were converted to cash at the exchange rate of 75 ECU to e1. Mean earnings
in the NW, FW, NS and FS treatments were e11.86, e12.11, e16.39 and e17.96,
respectively.
(see Devetag and Ortmann, 2007; Van-Huyck, 2008, for surveys). In general, people tend to pick
the payoff dominant strategy more often as the basin of attraction of the risk dominance equilibria
(Van-Huyck, 2008) decreases.
17Themixed-strategy equilibria in theNS and FS games are for depositors’ expected probability
of withdrawing early to be 0.43 and 0.53, respectively.
18The instructions are provided in the Appendix A. The two-part design allowed us to see if
experience mattered as well as collect more data with the same number of subjects. We did not
find an effect of experience so thus pooled the data.
19Each subject submits a “guess” g  0, 5, .., 100 as to how likely his opponent will withdraw
late. The payoffs from this task are 100 − 0.01g2 and 2g − 0.01g2 if the opponent withdraws early
and late, respectively. These symmetric penalties ensure that subjects have an incentive to submit
their truthful beliefs about their opponent’s action.
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4 Results
4.1 Preliminaries
We begin by examining the role of beliefs about other depositors’ actions in
determining withdrawal decisions. In the full information treatments there are
three relevant ranges of R for which beliefs play (potentially) different roles.
• Dominated (DOM) range. When R ≤ 200 it is both individually and col-
lectively rational to withdraw early—beliefs should not play any role in
decision-making.
• Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) range. When 200 < R < 400, subjects are playing
a prisoners’ dilemma; while it is a dominant strategy for a self-interested
subject to withdraw early, the same is not the case for subjects who exhibit
social preferences (see Charness and Rabin, 2002; Chakravarty et al., 2016).
• Coordination Game (COOR) range. When R ≥ 400, we have a coordination
game, in which beliefs about the other’s action is critical to determining
which equilibrium should be played.
To verify this relationship, we ran a linear probability fixed effects GLS model
of the decision to withdraw early on dummies for the relevant ranges of R (i.e.,
DOM, PDorCOOR), aswell as their interactionwith ameasure of belief about the
probability of the other depositor withdrawing early for the treatments with full
information. Table 2 summarises the results.20 In the no information treatments,
we only used beliefs as the sole regressor since subjects do not observe R.
We observe that the coefficients on beliefs are all positive and significant,
meaning that the higher the belief on the other playing withdrawing early, the
higher the likelihood of withdrawing early. In the full information treatments,
we also observe that subjects are significantly more likely to withdraw early as R
decreases. In the FW treatment, the coefficient on beliefs is significantly smaller
when R is in theDOM (F(1, 2725)  59.19, p < 0.0001) and PD (F(1, 2725)  160.14,
p < 0.0001) ranges than in the COOR range; in turn, the coefficient on beliefs
is significantly smaller in the DOM than in the PD range (F(1, 2725)  27.70,
p < 0.0001). In the FS treatment, the coefficient on beliefs is significantly smaller
when R is in the PD than in the COOR range (F(1, 2725)  28.75, p < 0.0001).
We next consider instead a more dynamic model, where subjects respond,
in an adaptive mode, to past behaviour. We therefore use early withdrawal
20We report cluster-robust standard errors at the subject level.
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Dependent variable: Early withdrawal
Treatment NW FW NS FS
DOM 0.596
(0.0385)
∗∗∗
PD 0.345
(0.0299)
∗∗∗ 0.452
(0.0364)
∗∗∗
Belief 0.004
(0.0002)
∗∗∗ 0.009
(0.0003)
∗∗∗ 0.006
(0.0003)
∗∗∗ 0.008
(0.0004)
∗∗∗
Belief × DOM −0.006
(0.0005)
∗∗∗
Belief × PD −0.003
(0.0004)
∗∗∗ −0.003
(0.0005)
∗∗∗
Constant 0.588
0.0188
∗∗∗ 0.124
0.0122
∗∗∗ 0.091
0.0105
∗∗∗ 0.044
0.009
∗∗∗
Number of observations 2,592 2,808 2,664 2,880
Number of subjects 72 78 74 80
R2 0.12 0.58 0.27 0.47
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. The “DOM" and “PD" dummy covariates refer to observa-
tions where R ≤ 200 and 200 < R < 400, respectively—the omitted category is the COOR range.
We do not have any DOM range observations in the strong outlook treatments. The “Belief"
variable refers to the subjects’ belief that their opponents will withdraw early.
∗∗∗ indicate p < 0.01.
Table 2. Fixed-effects GLS estimates of the role of beliefs.
decisions (subjects’ own and opponent’s) in the previous period as the main
regressor, interacted whenever appropriate with the relevant ranges of R.
Table 3 reports the results. In the no information treatments, we find that
both the subjects’ previous round withdrawal decision and their previous round
opponents’ withdrawal decision are positively correlated (significant at the 1%
level) with the present decision to withdraw early. The former correlation indi-
cates a temporal persistence interpretation; the latter indicates a degree of social
learning, in that interacting with an opponent who withdrew early may lead to
an update on the beliefs about the population of players—recall that our experi-
mental design had randommatching in every round. In contrast to the above, the
previous opponent’swithdrawal decision has no significant influence on subjects’
present withdrawal decision in the full information treatments. The estimates
also review that conditional onwithdrawing early in the previous round, subjects
in the FW are more significantly less likely to withdraw early when R is in the
DOM and PD ranges relative to the COOR range—the same finding applies to
the FS treatment.
Observation 1 Early withdrawal decisions are strongly correlated with past behaviour,
the level of R, and their belief about their current opponent’s action. They are not
consistently or strongly correlated with past behaviour of other players.
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Dependent variable: Early withdrawal
Treatment NW FW NS FS
DOM 0.767
(0.0321)
∗∗∗
PD 0.623
(0.0370)
∗∗∗ 0.587
(0.0258)
∗∗∗
Subject withdraws early in t-1 0.268
(0.0181)
∗∗∗ 0.164
(0.0282)
∗∗∗ 0.341
(0.0181)
∗∗∗ 0.034
(0.0195)
∗
Subject withdraws early in t-1 × DOM −0.247
(0.0366)
∗∗∗
Subject withdraws early in t-1 × PD −1.172
(0.0407)
∗∗∗ −0.156
(0.0436)
∗∗∗
Opponent withdraws early in t-1 0.090
(0.0173)
∗∗∗ 0.012
(0.0276)
0.139
(0.0141)
∗∗∗ 0.014
(0.0186)
Opponent withdraws early in t-1 × DOM 0.010
(0.0367)
Opponent withdraws early in t-1 × PD 0.001
(0.0406)
0.161
(0.0437)
∗∗∗
Constant 0.612
(0.0234)
∗∗∗ 0.255
(0.0253)
∗∗∗ 0.152
(0.0090)
∗∗∗ 0.239
(0.0108)
∗∗∗
Number of observations 2,520 2,730 2,590 2,800
Number of subjects 72 78 74 80
R2 0.15 0.40 0.52 0.24
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. The DOM and PD dummy covariates refer to observations
where R ≤ 200 and 200 < R < 400, respectively—the omitted category is the COOR range. We do
not have any DOM range observations in the strong outlook treatments.
∗∗∗ and ∗ indicate p < 0.01 and p < 0.10, respectively.
Table 3. Fixed-effects GLS model estimates of the determinants of early with-
drawal.
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Note. The left and right panels detail the boxplot distribution of fe (i.e., a depositor’s observed
frequency of withdrawing early) when the outlooks are weak and strong, respectively.
Figure 2. Boxplot distribution of fe in the NW, FW, NS and FS treatments.
4.2 Information disclosure and bank runs
Since a bank run occurswhenever a depositorwithdraws early, the analysis needs
to only focus on the depositors’ propensity to withdraw early. For each depositor,
define fe as his relative frequency of withdrawing early.21
,
22 Figure 2 reports the
boxplot distribution fe in all treatments.
The median fe for the NW and NS treatments are 0.97 and 0.17, respectively.
These observations suggest that when uninformed of the bank’s type, most de-
positors chose to withdraw early when the outlook is weak and late when the
outlook is strong. To see the influence of information disclosure on the expected
likelihood of bank runs, we compare fe in the NW and FW treatments as well as
fe in the NS and FS treatments.
Result 1 Information disclosure (revealing the bank’s type) when the outlook is weak
significantly reduces the expected likelihood of bank runs.
21For example, fe  0.5 implies that the subject hadwithdrawearly in half of all his experimental
rounds.
22For each subject, we do not find the realised frequencies of each bank’s type to be significantly
different (Wilcoxon Signrank, p ≥ 0.86) from the theoretical frequencies (i.e., equal chance for
each type).
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Support for Result 1: We find fe to be significantly higher in the NW relative to
FW treatment (two-tailed Mann-Whitney (MW), p < 0.001).
Result 2 Information disclosure (revealing the bank’s type) when the outlook is strong
significantly increases the expected likelihood of bank runs.
Support for Result 2: We find fe to be significantly lower in the NS relative to FS
treatment (MW, p  0.003).
To better understand Results 1 and 2, we compare depositors’ behaviour in
the full information regime when the bank’s type is θ, against behaviour in the
no information regime where the bank’s type is unknown. To do so, we define
fe(θ) as a depositor’s frequency of withdrawing early when the bank’s type is
observed to be θ.
Figure 3 details the boxplot of fe(θ) in the FW (top row) and FS (bottom
row) treatments. We also report the median fe in the NW and NS treatments.23
Intuitively, comparisons between the fe of the no information treatments and
fe(θ) of the full information treatments should shed light on the influence of
information disclosure at each type θ.
Result 3 Information disclosure (revealing the bank’s type) has mixed effects on the
depositors’ withdrawal decisions. In particular, information disclosure significantly in-
creases the likelihood of bank runs for lower type banks and significantly reduces the
likelihood of bank runs for higher type banks.
Support for Result 3: Relative to fe in the NW treatment we find fe(θ) in the
FW treatment to be significantly (MW, p < 0.001) higher when RW(θ) ≤ 200
and significantly (MW, p < 0.001) lower when RW(θ) ≥ 400. Relative to fe in
the NS treatment, we find fe(θ) in the FS treatment to be significantly (MW,
p < 0.001) higher when RS(θ) ≤ 400 and significantly (MW, p ≤ 0.02) lower when
RS(θ) ≥ 550.
To better understand Results 1-3, we partition the state space (i.e., the bank’s
type) in the FW and FS treatments into the plus-run,minus-run and neutral-run re-
gions where relative to their no information counterparts, information disclosure
significantly increases, significantly decreases and has no significant influence on
the likelihood of bank runs, respectively.24 The proportion of instances in the FW
23We do not find fe(θ) in the FW and FS treatments to be significantly different (MW, p ≥ 0.292)
for the intersection of types where 300 ≤ Rj(θ) ≤ 500.
24In the FW (resp. FS) treatment, the plus-run region corresponds to the types where RW(θ) ≤
200 (resp. RS(θ) ≤ 400) and the minus-run region corresponds to the types where RW(θ) ≥ 400
(resp. RS(θ) ≥ 550) – the remaining types correspond to the neutral-run region.
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Note. Each column details the boxplot distribution of fe(θ) in the FW (top row) and FS (bottom row) treatments for a given R
j(θ) value. The horizontal
line in each panel details the median fe in the NW (top row) and NS (bottom row) treatments. The header of each panel also details the two-tailed
Mann-Whitney test p-value for the comparisons between the fe(θ) in the full information treatment and fe in the no information treatment.
Figure 3. Boxplot distribution of fe(θ) in the FW and FS treatments.
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treatment where depositors in the plus-run, minus-run and neutral-run regions
withdrew early are 97%, 38% and 86%, respectively. For the FS treatment, the
corresponding proportions are 77%, 14% and 31%, respectively. Finally, the pro-
portion of instances in the NW and NS treatments where depositors withdrew
early are 95% and 30%, respectively.
Clearly, Result 3 shows that information disclosure can mitigate and exac-
erbate the likelihood of banks runs. When the outlook is weak, information
disclosure ‘mitigates” in the minus-run region to a greater extent than it “exac-
erbates” in the plus-run. The opposite is observed when the outlook is strong
where information disclosure mitigates in the minus-run region to a lesser extent
than it exacerbates in the plus-run region. As a consequence, information dis-
closure mitigates and exacerbates the expected likelihood of bank runs when the
outlook is weak and strong, respectively.
Finally, the above results also hold when we consider a depositor’s frequency
of withdrawing early weighted by the theoretical frequencies of each possible
bank types.25 We also draw similar findings when the analysis focuses on depos-
itors’ beliefs as to their opponents’ likelihood of withdrawing early.
5 Conclusion
We add to the discussion of information disclosure in coordination games by
providing experimental evidence in the context of a bank run game about how
depositors respond to public information about the solvency of the bank. We
show that the effects of information provision are highly dependent on the dis-
tribution of the underlying state of the world. Information provision affects
behaviour at the extremes of the distribution of outcomes. That is to say, it affects
behaviour in rare events (that is, bank insolvency in good times, or bank solvency
in bad times).
We find that less transparency results in more runs when the expected health
of the bank is fragile and less runswhen the expected health of the bank is strong.
In the former scenario, without information the subjects will coordinate on the
run action. So if the policy maker’s objective is to avoid failing banks, then clearly
having a full disclosure policy would be better when the economy is weak.
A promising line of future work is to expand the ability of the regulator to
communicate in two ways. First, we can make the regulator a player in the game.
25In doing so, we better control for the distribution of types realised by depositors in the
experiment.
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Our current setup is equivalent to forcing the regulator to have full commitment
to either always commit to fully reveal his information or to always conceal his
information. Second, we can alter these level of commitment to either restricting
the regulator to always send the truth, but not restricted to which truth (a form
of verifiability) or even no commitment at all (say anything even if it is lying).
——————
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APPENDIX
A Instructions
Table A1 details the number of participants in each session. There were two parts
to the experiment, Part A (19 rounds) and Part B (17 rounds). The instructions
to the relevant parts were only distributed at the start of the part. Both parts are
identical.
Session Date (Time) Treatment No. of subjects
1 03.06.2016 (0930) FS 20
2 03.06.2016 (1130) FW 20
3 01.07.2016 (0930) NS 20
4 01.07.2016 (1130) NW 20
5 07.07.2016 (0930) FS 20
6 07.07.2016 (1100) FW 20
7 07.07.2016 (1230) NS 20
8 07.07.2016 (1445) NW 18
9 24.10.2016 (1100) FS 20
10 24.10.2016 (1330) FW 20
11 26.10.2016 (0930) NS 20
12 26.10.2016 (1300) NW 18
13 07.11.2016 (0945) FS 20
14 07.11.2016 (1130) FW 18
15 09.11.2016 (1000) NS 14
16 09.11.2016 (1130) NW 16
Table A1. Details of experimental sessions.
The experiment was conducted in English. The following details the instruc-
tions for the FW (full information; weak outlook) treatment. Sentences which
are unique to the strong outlook treatments will be marked in “text". Sentences
which are unique to the no information treatments will be marked in “text".
A.1 Instructions: Introduction
Welcome to the experiment. Please read these instructions carefully. Your pay-
ment in this experiment will depend on your decisions and the decisions made
by other people; it is therefore important you understand the rules of the experi-
ment. In this experiment, your decisions will earn Experimental Currency Units
(ECU).
20
75 ECU are worth e1.
At the end of the experiment, we will calculate your total ECU and convert it into
euros. In addition, you will also receive a e4 show up payment.
The experimentwill consist of two parts (Part-A andPart-B). The experimental
design for Part-A is detailed below. We will inform you about the experimental
design for Part-B once we have completed the Part-A experiment.
A.2 Instructions: Part-A
The Part-A experiment consists of at least 15 rounds. The actual number will be
randomly determined by the computer but you will not know this number. At
the end of Part-A, the computer will randomly choose your payoffs from one of
the rounds and convert it into cash.
A.2.1 The Start of Each Round
At the start of each round, the computer will randomly match you with another
player in this session. In addition, the computer will randomly generate a value
for the variable R. Here, R can be any number between 0 and 500 300 and 800
in steps of 50, with each value being equally likely. The below table (Table A2)
clarifies the possible values for R and the chance for each value.
Value
of R
0
300
50
350
100
400
150
450
200
500
250
550
300
600
350
650
400
700
450
750
500
800
Chance 1/11 1/11 1/11 1/11 1/11 1/11 1/11 1/11 1/11 1/11 1/11
Table A2. Value of R.
• Both players will observe the value for R. Both players will NOT observe
the value for R.
• Each player also has a saving account in a Bank worth 400 ECU.
Given the above, each player will perform two tasks. Your payoff from each
task will depend on your decision and the decision of the other player. Your
payoff for the round will be a combination of the payoffs from both tasks.
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You withdraw Today
You Withdraw Tomorrow
Other Player Other Player
withdraws Today withdraws Tomorrow
200 400
0 R
Figure A1. Task-A.
Task-A. Your first task is to decide whether you want to withdraw your money
TODAY or wait until TOMORROW. The below table (Figure A1) describes how
your payoff from the task will be computed.
• If both players withdraw today, you get 200 ECU (other player gets 200
ECU).
• If both players withdraw tomorrow, you get R ECU (other player gets R
ECU).
• If you withdraw today and the other player tomorrow, you get 400 ECU
(other player gets 0 ECU).
• If youwithdraw tomorrow and the other player today, you get 0 ECU (other
player gets 400 ECU).
Task-B. Your second task is to submit your guess as to how likely the other
player will withdraw Tomorrow. To do so, you will submit a number between
0 and 100, in increments of 5 (i.e., 0, 5, 10, 15,...,95, 100). Here, a low number
implies that it is highly unlikely for the other player to withdraw tomorrow. A
high number implies that it is highly likely for the other player to withdraw
tomorrow. Depending on your submitted guess and the withdrawal decision of
the other player, your payoffs will be computed as follow:
For example, if your guess is 25 and the other playerwithdraws today, youwill
receive 93.75 ECU. If your guess is 90 and the other player withdraws tomorrow,
you will receive 99 ECU.
Final Payoffs for the Round. Once both players have completed Task-A and
Task-B, we will compute your payoffs.
Payoffs for the Round = Payoffs Task-A + Payoffs Task-B
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Your guess Other player withdraws
today
Other player withdraws
tomorrow
0 100 0
5 99.75 9.75
10 99 19
15 97.75 27.75
20 96 26
25 93.75 43.75
30 91 51
35 87.75 57.75
40 84 64
45 79.95 69.75
50 75 75
55 69.75 79.75
60 64 84
65 57.75 87.75
70 51 91
75 43.75 93.75
80 36 96
85 27.75 97.75
90 19 99
95 9.75 99.75
100 0 100
Table A3. Task-B.
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A.2.2 Control questions
Here are some questions that examines your understanding of Part-A design.
Please submit your answers in the computer screen.
1. There are at least 15 rounds in Part-A. (True/false)
2. You had chosen to withdraw today and the other player had chosen to
withdraw tomorrow. Your Payoffs from Task-A will be ___. (0 ECU; 200
ECU; 400 ECU; R ECU)
3. You had chosen to withdraw tomorrow and the other player had chosen to
withdraw tomorrow. Your Payoffs from Task-A will be ___. (0 ECU; 200
ECU; 400 ECU; R ECU)
4. You had chosen to withdraw tomorrow and the other player had chosen to
withdraw today. Your Payoffs from Task-A will be ___. (0 ECU; 200 ECU;
400 ECU; R ECU)
5. You submit a Guess of 45 and the other player withdraws today. Your
Payoffs from Task-B will be ___
6. Both Players will observe R. (True/false)
A.2.3 Other information
Please be reminded that the experiment in Part-Awill consist of at least 15 rounds.
We will inform you about the Part-B experiment was we have completed Part-
A. After Part-B is completed, we will require you to complete a simple survey
form. Please raise your hands if there are any questions and the experimenter
will answer your questions in private.
A.3 Instructions: Part-B
Part-B of the experiment is identical to Part A.
Reminders
• The Part-B experiment consists of at least 15 rounds. The actual number
will be randomly determined by the computer but you will not know this
number. At the end of Part-B, the computer will randomly choose your
payoffs from one of the rounds and convert it into cash.
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• Both players will observe the value for R. Both players will NOT observe
the value for R.
• Each player will perform two tasks (Task-A and Task-B). Your payoff from
each task will depend on your decision and the decision of the other player.
Your payoff for the round will be a combination of the payoffs from both
tasks.
25
